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Debating Italy's “Modern Economic Growth”: A Quantitative History 
The Oxford Handbook of the Italian Economy since Unification, edited by Gianni Toniolo, is the 
result of a collective research on Italy's “modern economic growth” conducted by Italian and 
international scholars, as well as members of the research departments of the Bank of Italy, on the 
occasion of the sesquicentennial of the country's political unification. Based on the papers presented
at the international conference “Italy and the World Economy, 1861-2011” hosted by the Bank of 
Italy in October 2011, the volume is composed of twenty-one chapters, most of which are co-
authored by both Italian and non-Italian authors; a rich final bibliography; and some eighty-five 
pages of quantitative data on the Italian economy since 1861. As stressed by the editor (p. 4), such 
data are the fresh findings of recent quantitative research in a number of fields, and include new 
statistics on national accounts, productivity, and welfare indicators, as well as new measures of 
various economically relevant factors ranging from firm size to the efficiency of the banking 
system. Most of the chapters are organized as commentaries to such new data sets, so that the 
volume carries a declared emphasis on cliometric analysis.
The first five essays present the big picture of the changes and continuities in the Italian economy 
since unification, with an emphasis on GDP growth and/or stagnation as the main indicator of Italy's
“performance.” In particular, the introductory chapter by Gianni Toniolo provides the intellectual 
glue that keeps together the entire volume, that is the will to understand the puzzling relationship 
between the robust growth rate experienced by Italy for roughly a century (mid-1880s to early 
1990s) and the “two tails” of sluggish growth (1861-96 and 1992-present), which frame such “tale 
of convergence” with the productivity leaders (p. 5). Harold James and Kevin O' Rourke discuss 
Italian economic policies between unification and World War Two in comparative perspective, 
convincingly showing that the Italian case was not “particularly unusual” in the context of the “first 
age of globalization” (p. 38). Nicholas Crafts and Marco Magnani deal in a similar fashion with the 
period between World War Two and 2007. Andrea Boltho compares Italy's post-1945 
macroeconomic experience with those of Germany and Japan, the other two main countries 
defeated in World War Two, which have also seen their postwar “economic miracles” replaced by 
slow growth rates since the 1990s. Marcello De Cecco provides a fascinating overview on how the 
Italian economy has been represented by foreign observers since unification. Each of the subsequent
chapters presents a historical account of some specific aspect of Italy's economy over the period 
from unification to the present: national accounts, productivity, standards of living, human capital, 
migrations, civic capital, comparative advantages, exchange rates and trade, innovation, the 
behavior and strategies of Italian multinational firms, technology, the characteristics of the banking 
system, public debt, the efficiency of the administrative system, and the North/South dualism.
While a volume of such complexity necessarily offers a multifaceted and nuanced set of 
interpretations of the subjects at issue, it seems fair to summarize its main argument in the 
following terms, largely based on Toniolo's introductory chapter: the initial period of “tenuous 
growth” resulted from the slow pace of economic unification after political unification was 
achieved; the secular process of “catch-up” with the productivity leaders was made possible by the 
completion of the unification of the domestic market, coupled with the positive interaction between 
Italy's “late industrialization” and the “first globalization” internationally; after an “intermission” 
between 1929 and 1945, the catch-up took on full strength between 1950 and 1973, when the 
“mixed economy” inspired by the Constitution of 1947 benefited from the fact that “the 
technologies of the day, largely adaptations of the Fordist model, were well suited to a country 
endowed with an abundant labor force, possessed of basic education, and a relatively small but 
sophisticated cadre of engineers” (p. 22); after a “silver age” of some twenty years of “respectable” 
(p. 25) growth rates, opened by the “oil shock” of 1973, the Italian economy began to lose ground 
again after 1990. Here, despite a “good number of reforms” (p. 31), Italy's old weaknesses came 
back with a vengeance: the “North South divide, low human and social capital, weak competition in
the domestic product and labor markets, inefficient public administration, and insufficient research 
and development” (p. 31), which were not crucial in the Fordist “golden age,” all became a much 
greater drag on the economy when the “second globalization,” the euro, and the technological 
revolution in information and communication set in.
Given the scope and depth of the analysis and the richness of the new data, the reader has much to 
learn from this book. It is not possible to discuss here all the stimulating findings and reflections 
offered by this volume, but some need to be highlighted. The overall trajectory of the Italian 
economy is one in which the country's GDP per person multiplied by twelve in 150 years (as 
discussed extensively in Alberto Baffigi's chapter on the new time series of Italy's national 
accounts). Life expectancy at birth has grown from thirty to eighty-two years, income distribution 
(as measured by the Gini coefficient) has become more egalitarian, and the percentage of the 
population close or below the absolute poverty line (defined as an income of 1.5 euros per day at 
2010 purchasing power) decreased from 40 to 4 percent (as discussed extensively by Andrea 
Brandolini and Giovanni Vecchi in their chapter on the standards of living). At the same time, such 
changes have not occurred linearly, but in leaps and bounds, and with periods of regress (including 
the current, post-1992, “tail”). From this standpoint, the combined reading of the three chapters by 
Cratfs/Magnani, Boltho, and Brandolini/Vecchi challenges the conventional view of the 1970s as a 
decade of “economic crisis”: while lower than in the previous decade, GDP growth remained quite 
high by historical standards (higher than in Germany and Japan in relative terms), and inequalities 
were reduced dramatically. The most striking of Italian inequalities, the North/South divide, is 
analyzed in greater detail in the chapter by Giovanni Iuzzolino, Guido Pellegrini, and Gianfranco 
Viesti. By making use of per capita output and indicators of “human development” the three authors
confirm that such regional divide is one of Italy's most acute disparities, but also convincingly show
that “the great durability of the Southern question [does not mean] that, in the history of Italian 
regional development, nothing has ever changed” (p. 571): while the available data still leave as an 
open question when the North/South gap began, the chapter documents the dynamic nature of the 
issue (showing a widening of the gap after unification, its “explosion” during the interwar period, 
its reduction up to the 1970s, and then its renewed widening afterwards).
While extremely informative, the volume is less convincing in other respects. Other reviewers have 
already noted its lack of attention to gender issues, as well as to the environmental costs of “modern
economic growth.” The chapter by Fabrizio Onida, Giuseppe Berta, and Mario Perugini on Italian 
multinational firms does shed light on the choices and strategies of a particular segment of Italy's 
“big guys,” but the broader picture of class relations remains largely unexplored. All these elements 
could have indeed contributed to provide the reader with a more shaded and complex understanding
of the real effects of economic change in terms of wellbeing (or lack thereof). Indeed, such gaps 
have been graciously acknowledged by the editor himself.[1] One could add that European 
integration is not dealt with extensively, not even in the monetary field. However, the problem is not
that more could be added. What seems to be missing in the volume is rather a consistent indication 
of the criterion that has driven the choice, whether or not a certain “societal” dimension should be 
considered economically relevant. That is: what precisely are the borders of “the economy” as a 
subject of scientific inquiry?
The same point is critical also in another respect. Virtually all the chapters in the book openly adopt 
a normative approach, aimed at evaluating Italy's “performance” in terms of its adherence (or lack 
thereof) to an expected pattern of convergence with the productivity leaders, as drawn by Alexander
Gerschenkron in his 1962 article on “economic backwardness” (pp. 5-9). In short, the Italian 
performance is “virtuous” when it converges with the productivity leader, “disappointing” when it 
diverges. From this standpoint, the volume possibly represents a step away -and back?- from the 
interpretative picture that readers acquired in reading Storia economica d'Italia. Vol. 1 (1999), co-
edited by the same Gianni Toniolo with Pierluigi Ciocca. In that volume, the editors made the 
deliberate choice to have the “economic history” of Italy written by historians who did not 
necessarily belong to the community of “economic historians.” The result was that people, 
organized groups, national and foreign institutions appeared much more prominently on the scene. 
The ups and downs of GDP and other indicators were contextualized to the specific--and often 
conflicting--desires, goals, agendas and needs of these social actors, which, on an empirical basis, 
were for most of the time relatively indifferent to the goal of “convergence” as such.[2] Regardless 
whether one thinks that the latter should be the ultimate goal of national policies, to project it onto 
past epochs, “as if” it had been the goal of the actors involved, often leads to explaining the 
obvious: convergence might not have been achieved at certain points, simply because it was not the 
prevalent objective of the day.
There is then a more specific critical remark to be made, which may possibly sound paradoxical 
given the lines above. Convergence seems to have become elusive precisely at the time when it 
became a recognized policy goal, as highlighted by the public debates surrounding the most crucial 
decisions of the last thirty-five years: Italy's entry into the European Monetary System (and later the
Euro), the “divorce” between the Bank of Italy and the Treasury, and the set of major policy reforms
undertaken between 1979 and 1999, including an “impressive” volume of privatization (p. 97). Put 
before the need to explain such a “disappointing” divergence (p. 5), most contributors to the volume
provide an unsatisfactory answer: the reforms were either half-baked or late, or both. As one 
previous reviewer has noted, however, after thirty years such answers remind us of the self-
reassuring attitude once displayed by the true believers in “really existing socialism”: the idea is 
right, but the implementation was wrong.[3] The editor and contributors do not necessarily have to 
share in the conviction that we are now in the age of (neoliberal) “zombie economics,” that is, the 
notion that the reforms which they regard as optimal are most likely bad.[4] But certainly, to 
paraphrase Ronald Reagan's first inaugural speech, a learned and sophisticated volume, as this one, 
did need a convincing discussion of the hypothesis that those reforms “are the problem, not the 
solution,” if only to deny it any explanatory value.
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